Introduction
It is well documented that there is a positive association between dividend change announcements and stock price changes.l Three potential explanations for this phenomenon have received attention in the recent literature.
First, numerous dividend signaling models predict that dividend changes con? vey information about cash flows; i.e., a dividend increase (decrease) conveys favorable (unfavorable) information about the current and/or future cash flows of the firm (Bhattacharya (1979) , John and Williams (1985) , Miller and Rock (1985) ).
Empirical evidence on earnings behavior following dividend changesstrates that, if changes in equity value are proportional to unexpected dividend changes, percentage changes in stock prices (excess returns) must be functions of unexpected changes in dividend per share deflated by the market price ofthe firm's shares. Since an equivalent percentage change in the dividend of a high-yield firm will result in a greater change relative to the market value of the firm's equity than that of a low-yield firm,2 dividend changes of high Q and low Q firms are likely to generate different stock price responses simply because the dividend changes of high Q (low-yield) firms are likely to be smaller than those of low Q (high-yield) firms.
Using a sample of 6,777 large dividend changes over the period 1962-1988, we find that announcement period excess returns are positively related to the mag? nitude of the standardized dividend change and to dividend yield but unrelated to Tobin's Q. These findings support the cash flow signaling and dividend clientele hypotheses but fail to provide support for the overinvestment hypothesis. Further? more, the results of a more refined test of the overinvestment hypothesis using the interaction of Tobin's Q with a measure of undistributed cash flow also fail to support the overinvestment hypothesis.
We provide further evidence on the cash flow signaling and overinvestment hypotheses by examining revisions in analysts' earnings forecasts and changes in capital expenditures following dividend change announcements. Consistent with previous studies and with the cash flow signaling hypothesis, we find that analysts significantly revise their earnings forecasts following dividend changes. In addition, we find that Q < 1 firms actually increase their capital expenditures following dividend increases and decrease them following dividend decreases, directly opposite the predictions of the overinvestment hypothesis. These results hold for three alternative proxies for the level of investment that would have been expected in the absence of the dividend change.
The remainder ofthe paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the various dividend change hypotheses.
Section III documents the abnormal returns associated with dividend change announcements.
Revisions in analysts'
earnings forecasts and changes in capital expenditures are examined in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II. Cash Flow Signaling, Overinvestment, and Dividend

Clienteles
Dividend signaling models typically predict that unexpected changes in div? idends convey information regarding the level of current and future cash flows.
Consequently, changes in the firm's equity value surrounding dividend announce? ments are directly proportional to the unexpected dividend.
This implies that excess returns around dividend announcements will be functions of unexpected changes in dividend per share deflated by the market price of the firm's shares (Christie (1987) ). Asquith and Mullins (1983) find empirical support for this proposition in a sample of dividend initiations and subsequent dividend increases. 2To see this, consider two firms with dividends per share of $1. Firm A's stock price is $10, while Firm B's price is $20. If each firm increases dividends by 10 percent, the change will be equal to 1 percent of Firm A's stock price and 0.5 percent of Firm B's stock price.
Under the cash flow signaling hypothesis, therefore, announcements of divi? dend increases will be met with positive abnormal stock returns, on average, and negative abnormal stock returns will follow announcements of dividend decreases. Furthermore, the magnitude of the stock price response will be positively related to the size of the dividend change relative to the value of the firm's equity, which we refer to as the standardized dividend change. In addition, if dividend changes signal changes in future cash flows, analysts should revise their forecasts of cash flows in the same direction following announcements of dividend changes.
Lang and Litzenberger's (1989) overinvestment hypothesis suggests that un? expected dividend change announcements by those firms that are overinvestors convey information regarding the firms' levels of future investment. A dividend increase suggests to the market that the firm will invest less in the future than was expected. This is good news because the firm was expected to invest wastefully, i.e., in negative NPV projects. By the same token, a dividend decrease in a firm that was expected to invest unprofitably increases the market's assessment of the amount that will be wastefully invested, leading to a decrease in firm value.
Tobin's Q, defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm to its replacement value, is one indicator of the profitability of new investment opportunities. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) show that with scale-expanding investments and diminishing returns to capital, Tobin's Q less than one is a sufficient condition for a firm to be overinvesting. Conversely, a Tobin's Q greater than one is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a firm to be at the value-maximizing level of invest? ment. Under the overinvestment hypothesis, then, only Q < 1 firms are expected to experience abnormal stock price changes following dividend change announce? ments. However, because Tobin's Q measures a firm's marginal Q with error, we may still observe abnormal stock price changes for some Q > 1 firms. Neverthe? less, if our estimates of Tobin's Q are directly related to the true marginal Q, the overinvestment hypothesis predicts that the absolute abnormal stock price changes associated with dividend change announcements will be greater, on average, for Q < 1 firms than for Q > 1 firms.
The overinvestment hypothesis also has clear implications for changes in the level of investment by Q < 1 firms following dividend changes. Under this hypothesis, Q < 1 firms experience positive excess returns following dividend increase announcements because the increase reduces the market's expectation of the amount of cash that will be wastefully invested. Thus, the overinvestment hypothesis predicts that the capital expenditures of Q < 1 firms will be less than previously expected following dividend increases and greater than previously expected following dividend decreases. Finally, the dividend clientele hypothesis suggests that, ceteris paribus, the stock price response to an unexpected dividend change announcement will be related to the dividend preferenees of the marginal investor in that firm. If highyield firms attract investors with a preference for higher dividends, a dividend increase will be better news for high-yield firms than for low-yield firms. Similarly, dividend decreases will result in less severe stock price drops for low-yield firms since investors in low-yield stocks prefer lower dividend payments.
Thus, the absolute magnitude ofthe stock price response to a dividend change announcement will be positively related to the dividend yield of the firm. 
B. Stock Returns Tests
The findings reported in Table 2 underscore the importance of simultaneously controlling for Tobin's Q, the standardized dividend change, and dividend yield when examining dividend announcement returns. To do so, we divide the sample of dividend announcements into quartiles on the basis of standardized dividend change, into quartiles on the basis of dividend yield, and according to whether Q < 1 or Q > 1. For dividend decreases, we use the negative of the observed excess return and of the standardized dividend change.7 The results are reported in Table 3.   TABLE 3 Mean Two-Day Announcement Period Percentage Excess Returns for a Sample of 6,777
Dividend Changes over the Period 1962 Period -1988a aFirms are assigned to quartiles based on the standardized change in dividend and to quartiles based on the level of dividend yield. The negative of the excess returns and standardized dividend changes is used for dividend decreases. Change in dividend is the absolute change in dividend divided by the market value of equity two days prior to the dividend announcement. Dividend yield is defined as the most recent quarterly dividend divided by the market value of equity two days prior to the dividend announcement. bNA means there is no observation in this cell. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
7We have also tabulated the excess returns for dividend increases and decreases separately. For dividend increases, there are no cells in columns (2)-(5) of Panels A-D in which the excess returns of Q < 1 firms are significantly greater than those of Q > 1 firms. For dividend decreases, excess returns for Q < 1 firms are significantly more negative than those of Q > 1 firms in columns (3) and (4) of Panel C. However, because there are fewer decreases, the sample size in some ofthe cells is too small to make any meaningful inferences for the dividend decrease sample. We present regression results separately for dividend increases and decreases in Table 4 . Consistent with the cash flow signaling hypothesis, column (1) of Table 3 reports that the magnitude of the stock price reaction increases with the size of the dividend change in both the Q < 1 and Q > 1 samples.
Excess The absolute magnitude of the average abnormal stock price response to dividend change announcements increases with increasing dividend yield for both Q > landQ < 1 firms. The relationship between dividend yield and excess returns is weaker, however, after controlling for the standardized dividend change in Panels A-D. Excess returns increase monotonically across dividend yield quartiles for both Q > 1 and Q < 1 firms in the lowest dividend change quartile, for Q < 1 firms in the second dividend change quartile, and for Q > 1 firms in the third dividend change quartile. The increase is not strictly monotonic for Q > 1 firms in the second dividend change quartile, for Q < 1 firms in the third dividend change quartile, or for Q < 1 or Q > 1 firms in the highest dividend change quartile.
In Table 4 To test the overinvestment hypothesis, we compute the value ofthe partial derivative of XR with respect to QDUM. Our results are qualitatively equivalent to the results presented in Table 4 : excess returns are significantly greater for Q > 1 firms than for Q < 1 firms in the dividend increase subsample but do not differ significantly between Q < 1 and Q > 1 firms in the dividend decrease subsample.
The results presented in the three panels of Table 4 Table 4 . We also estimate all of the regressions using Q as a continuous variable rather than a dichotomous variable. None of the results is qualitatively affected.
10We also ran the regressions having redefined QDUM to equal 1 when Q > 1 and CFLOW is less than the sample median and to equal 0 when Q < 1 and CFLOW is greater than the sample median. This reduces the sample to 2,539 observations. The coefficients on this dummy variable are insignificant in all three regressions. We compare standardized forecast revisions around dividend change an?
nouncements to estimates ofthe expected forecast revision computed using Brous's (1992) method.13 Specifically, the expected forecast revision for firm / in month t is estimated by the following,
where k is the forecastable component of the forecast revision and is estimated as the average two-month standardized forecast revision for all months available on the I\B\E\S tape except months ?6 to +6 relative to the dividend change month;14 e^t-c represents the unforecastable component and is equal to the differ? ence between k and the actual two-month standardized forecast revision for firm i in month t ? c. Following Brous (1992), we assume n = 5, which implies that analyst forecast revisions follow a fourth-order moving average process.15 The unexpected forecast revision is then simply the difference between the actual and expected forecast revision. Table 5 presents median standardized unexpected forecast revisions for the sample as a whole and for subsamples classified according to the direction of the dividend change and Tobin's Q.16 Overall, analysts revise their forecast of the 13We have also replicated our tests under the naive assumption that the expected forecast revision is equal to zero. Our results are qualitatively similar using this alternate approach. 14Each forecast revision is standardized by the firm's stock price at the midpoint of the two-month period.
15The choice of n = 5 is motivated by the empirical observation that approximately 20 percent of analysts update their earnings forecasts in a given month. Brous (1992) provides support for the use of the fourth-order moving average process.
16Median revisions for the sample as a whole are calculated using the negative of the change for dividend decreases. The difference is significant at the 0.01 level for the increases and at the 0.02 level for the decreases.18 These findings are consistent with the fact that the dividend 17The larger revisions following dividend decreases could reflect the fact that dividend decreases are less common than increases and are therefore less anticipated. This would suggest that dividend decreases convey more information than do dividend increases. This is clearly not the complete explanation, however, because it would imply that the magnitude ofthe difference in revisions between the increases and decreases should be greater in the Q > 1 sample, where dividend decreases are less likely. Table 5 indicates that the reverse is true.
18We also estimated the regressions reported in Table 4 , substituting the unexpected standardized forecast revisions for the standardized dividend changes. If dividend changes convey valuable infor? mation, excess returns surrounding dividend change announcements should be positively related to analysts' forecast revisions. Using Model (1) from Table 4 , the relation between announcement period excess returns and analyst forecast revisions is significantly positive for the full sample (t = 4.81), changes for Q < 1 firms are larger than those ofthe Q > 1 firms. Indeed, when we regress the unexpected standardized forecast revision on the standardized dividend change (CHNG) and a binary variable denoting Q > 1 firms (QDUM), we find that CHNG is significantly positive in the full sample (t = 7.0) and the sample of dividend increases (t = 1.9), but insignificant in the dividend decrease sam? ple. QDUM is not significant in any of the regressions. Collectively, these results provide strong support for the cash flow signaling hypothesis.19
B. Changes in Capital Expenditures
The overinvestment hypothesis predicts that overinvesting firms will experi? ence positive excess returns following dividend increase announcements because the increase reduces the market's expectations of the the amount of cash that will be wastefully invested. Under this hypothesis, then, capital expenditures of Q < 1 firms will be less than previously expected following dividend increases and greater than previously expected following dividend decreases. The overinvestment hy? pothesis makes no clear predictions regarding the future investment level of Q > 1 firms. The cash flow signaling and dividend clientele hypotheses make no clear predictions about the future investment level of either type of firm.
In Table 6 Our tests cannot reject the hypothesis that dividend change announcements convey some information about the investment policy of the firm or the hypothesis that agency cost considerations play some role in determining the level of divi? dend payments. Indeed, agency cost considerations underlie the hypothesized link between Tobin's Q and dividend yield in Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993). However, it seems clear that the overinvestment hypothesis is not the predominant explanation for the incremental information content of dividend change announcements. This is consistent with the argument made by Jensen (1986) and others that regular dividend payments are likely to be weak substitutes for debt payments in controlling free cash flow problems.
